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Abstract
The present paper addresses the lack of institutional collaboration among urban ethnic (or 
migrant) firms as a reason for their low innovation profile. This lack is present in various 
forms of institutional business cooperation, but here we focus in particular on franchising. 
Such weak collaborative embeddedness is noteworthy, given the fact that franchising 
offers for small and medium-sized enterprises  (SMEs)  an important means to compete 
better. Poor communication, a low chance to be accepted by the external party, and 
economic market factors appear to be important reasons why ethnic entrepreneurs do not 
join franchise organizations. The low chance of acceptance is primarily reflected in the 
entrepreneurs’ perception of their unfavorable market conditions, but in addition there are 
other reasons for low participation which can be rectified. From our research, general 
lessons can be derived which are applicable also to other situations in which ethnic 
entrepreneurs may also be less inclined to join institutional cooperative systems. With 
these lessons in mind, the competitive and innovative potential of ethnic entrepreneurs 
can be improved.
JEL codes: L22 Vertical Integration; L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; M13 
Entrepreneurship
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11. Introduction
Despite the large influx of ethnic minority (or migrant) entrepreneurs of various 
origins in the Dutch society, members of this group rarely join institutional collaborative 
business organizations. This is surprising, as institutional embeddedness and anchoring is 
usually seen as a powerful organizational mechanism for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). In this paper we focus on franchise organizations, which ethnic 
entrepreneurs hardly ever join. It is, in contrast, noteworthy that the degree of mutual 
collaboration among native Dutch firms in the SME sector is generally very high. 
The motivation for our study stems from the fact that it is, from a social cohesion 
point of view, important to understand why a certain group within society acts very 
differently from the rest of society. Furthermore, it is also important to know whether this 
deviation is temporary or structural, and whether it will be solved by itself over time or 
only with external assistance (see Davidsson, 2002).
Much has been written about the attitude and behavior of ethnic entrepreneurs in 
Western economies, mostly from a sociological point of view. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the subject of this paper, viz. the lack of institutional collaboration in the 
form of franchise organizations among ethnic small firms, has never been dealt with to 
date. In this paper, we investigate the reasons for the weak institutional collaboration 
among small ethnic firms, by means of an empirical analysis based on semi-structured 
interviews with 40 ethnic (Turkish) entrepreneurs in Amsterdam (the Netherlands). 
Turks, who have already lived in large groups in the Netherlands since the 1960s, appear 
to have a strong inclination to engage in entrepreneurial activities, which means that this 
group is particularly relevant for the present study. The retail sector, with its low entry 
barriers, is by definition an important sector in this context.
An important survival strategy for SMEs in the highly competitive retail grocery 
sector in the Western world is franchising (‘franchising’ is used in this paper as a generic 
term that encompasses all institutional collaborative systems in the retail sector and also 
includes purchase (or buying) groups and voluntary wholesale organizations). 
Participating in franchise organizations enables entrepreneurs to compete with big chain 
stores and to negotiate more effectively with wholesalers and manufacturers. This 
participation can also lead to improvement of their innovative capacity. All in all, (more) 
participation in franchise organizations may also be beneficial from a macro point of 
view. In any case, differences in organisational behaviour of firms calls for further 
investigation.
In the light of these advantages, the question emerges: Why do Turkish entrepreneurs 
not join such organizations? This is the key question of our study.
2The paper is organized as follows. Following a brief and selective review of the 
most essential elements of ethnic entrepreneurship (Section 2), we outline the main 
features of franchising (Section 3). Next, several research questions are formulated 
(Section 4), which are tested by means of interviewing a sample of 40 Turkish 
entrepreneurs in Amsterdam. After a description of the empirical database (Sections 5 and 
6), the research questions are addressed empirically. This is done first from the point of 
view of the ethnic entrepreneurs themselves (Section 7), and then in terms of their 
perceived reasons for rejection by the franchise organizations (Section 8). Finally, our 
main conclusions and recommendations are formulated (Section 9).
2. Ethnic Entrepreneurship
2.1 Prefatory Remarks
Ethnic entrepreneurship has been intensively studied in recent years. The roots of 
these studies may be found in earlier works dating back to the 1950s. Rinder (1958) 
stressed the fact that all societies are internally differentiated or stratified, as a result of 
(amongst other factors) their history, level of economic development, societal complexity, 
cultural values, and political views. Simmel (1950) mentioned that – throughout the 
history of economics – the stranger everywhere appears as the trader (or the trader as 
stranger); this obviously places the ethnic entrepreneur in a specific socioeconomic 
context. Bonacich and Modell (1980) defined ‘ethnicity’ as a communalistic form of 
social affiliation, depending on the assumption of a special bond between people of like 
origins or on a disdain for people of dissimilar origins. Besides affiliation, another 
important reason may be found in solidarity based on shared class interest. Both forms of 
solidarity (ethnicity and class) cut across each other in complex societies. A set of ethnic 
and racial minorities share a comparable position in the social structure of the societies in 
which they reside. They are referred to as ‘middlemen minorities’, and are often active in 
trade.
The aspects of ethnic entrepreneurship that have been most extensively studied in 
the literature are: the entrepreneurs’ relationships with their clients; their acquisition of 
capital and labor; and their motivations (Deakins, 1999). These subjects, of course,
overlap to some extent and are also interlinked. The ethnic group, or network, appears to 
play an important role in the behavior of ethnic entrepreneurs, or as Waldinger et al. 
(1990a) put it: connections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing a 
common national background or experience of migration influence the behavior of ethnic 
entrepreneurs. 
3Their own ethnic or social group plays an important role for ethnic entrepreneurs 
(see Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998; Sullivan, 2000). The core of this group is formed 
by the (extended) family (Ram et al., 2001). In order to better understand the relation 
between the entrepreneurs and their group members, this relationship is operationalized 
into three items: clients, capital and labor. Motivation is an important aspect of any form 
of entrepreneurship, but especially in ethnic entrepreneurship.
Waldinger et al. (1990a) aimed to explain both the immigrant groups’ entry into 
business and their different fates in terms of their access to opportunities, group 
characteristics, and the embeddedness of opportunities and resources within a specific set 
of historical conditions encountered by immigrating groups. The opportunity structure 
may have to do with market conditions (e.g. demand for ethnic consumer products, and 
undersupplied or abandoned markets). Group characteristics deal with a complex of 
interacting economic, social and psychological factors, and with resource mobility (due, 
for example to close ties between co-ethnics and ethnic social networks). 
2.2 Clients
Ethnic loyalties, informal networking, and communication patterns within the 
ethnic community provide an ethnic firm with potential competitive advantages. 
However, the literature also points to ambivalent relationships among ethnic 
entrepreneurs and their ethnic clientele. Dyer and Ross (2000), for example, noted 
ambivalent signals by business owners in such relationships. On the one hand, these 
entrepreneurs commented favorably on the loyalty of their co-ethnic clients, expressed a 
preference for these clients, and had a good relationship with them and also many 
business connections. On the other hand, the same entrepreneurs appeared to cast doubts 
on their co-ethnic clients’ loyalty, their inappropriate demands, their resentment of the 
entrepreneurs’ financial success, their spreading of unfavorable rumors, and the generally 
poor image of the ethnic enterprises in the minds of their fellow native countrymen.
Donthu and Cherian (1994) also noted specific sentiments within co-ethnic groups. 
They reported that, in the United States, Hispanics who have strong community 
identification were more likely to patronize Hispanic vendors than those who have weak 
community identification. The same was true for loyalty to brands used by family and 
friends: they were more influenced by targeted media messages and were less concerned 
with purely economic value. 
However, the competitive advantage of ethnic loyalty also makes the ethnic 
entrepreneurs vulnerable. In his study of Moroccan entrepreneurs in Amsterdam, Aakouk 
(2000) concluded that adjustment of their marketing mix (and especially of their 
4assortment) might enable ethnic entrepreneurs to go beyond their own ethnic market 
segments. Paradoxically, this could also imply alienation from their trusted ethnic clients. 
But, it may be possible that future generations of ethnic entrepreneurs will have less 
problems with institutional differences between the internal and external orientation of 
their business.
2.3 Capital and Labor
Important aspects of the relationships within the ethnic group also concern the input 
variables of capital and labor. Van Delft et al. (2000) revealed that social networks are 
ethnic-related attributes that may provide advantages. These networks appear to be 
multifaceted and flexible, and offer good possibilities for the efficient acquisition of 
finance and the recruitment of personnel. In general, ethnic businesses rely heavily on 
labor from their particular ethnic group or, more specifically, their (extended) family. 
Capital can be more easily borrowed informally in this setting. In addition, within the 
network of the ethnic group, individuals depend on an informal way of doing business 
and exchanging information, because there is mutual trust within the network. Lee et al. 
(1997) called this phenomenon the ‘social resources explanation’: the success of ethnic 
minority business can in part be explained by the existence of such social resources as 
rotating credits, a protected market, and a labor source. 
Deakins et al. (1997) stressed that constraints to successful diversification and 
development of ethnic businesses center mainly around their ability to access resources 
(especially finance) and new markets. The use of existing networks can form the bridge to 
mainstream development within their adopted country. Through their networks of 
relatives and co-nationals, ethnic entrepreneurs have privileged, flexible access to 
information, capital and labor (Kloosterman et al. 1998).
Basu (1998) found that the nature of ethnic entrepreneurial entry predominantly 
depends on the access to informal sources of capital and information, as well as on the 
entrant’s previous experience. Ruiz-Vargas (2000) concluded that non-native (immigrant-
owned) businesses in Puerto Rico had better access than natives to credit markets, 
possibly because of their economic position and power within the ethnic community. 
Texeira (1998) mentioned not only friends and relatives as being ethnic resources but also 
written media like newspapers. 
It thus seems plausible that a complex array of co-ethnic input factors may form a 
possible stimulus for successful entrepreneurship.
52.4 Motivation
Motivational factors form a third set of frequently studied issues in ethnic business. 
Ram (1994) argued that the social networks of immigrants, comprising community and 
family, play a major role in the operation of ethnic enterprises. Reliance on these 
networks may also be a response to the (assumed) presence of racism in the wide 
environment. Externally, the family is seen as a means of overcoming racial obstacles in 
the market, while, internally, it provides a flexible source of labor and a means of 
managerial discipline.
According to Deakins (1999), the history of disadvantage and discrimination has 
led to the concentration of ethnic minority firms and entrepreneurs in marginal areas of 
economic activity. Johnson (2000) mentioned both culture and disadvantage theory in 
explaining why immigrants become self-employed. Rafiq (1992) saw socioeconomic 
status as a better explanation for ethnic minorities entering business: their socioeconomic 
status is often relatively low, which is in part determined by cultural factors, especially 
the low participation of women in the labor force. Therefore, Rafiq (1992) argued that 
culture has an indirect impact on entrepreneurship.
Ethnic entrepreneurship has become a popular strategy in developing principles of 
self-reliance among ethnic groups, because it stimulates and encourages immigrants to 
take care of themselves, with only limited support from the government (Van Delft et al. 
2000). Kloosterman et al. (1998) stressed the fact that high levels of unemployment 
provide the motivation for an increasing number of immigrants to start their own 
businesses. This issue had already been discussed in the context of a dual labor market by 
Wilson and Portes (1980), who focused attention on the incorporation of new immigrants 
into the labor market. These authors confirmed the theories that considered new 
immigrants as being mainly additions to the secondary labor market, linked with small 
peripheral firms. They also introduced the possibility of the ‘enclave economy’ in 
connection with immigrant-owned firms, defining an enclave as a self-enclosed 
immigrant community (see also Peterson and Roquebert, 1993).
Flexibility on the labor market is another success factor. Li (1992) mentioned the 
traditional culture of certain ethnic groups, as well as blocked mobility, as important 
reasons for the successful development of ethnic entrepreneurship. Yoon (1995) asserted 
that there are three interacting factors which promote the growth of ethnic 
entrepreneurship: blocked employment opportunities in the general labor market (because 
of the language barrier and non-transferable education and occupational skills); resource 
mobilization (from stable structures and strong family ties); and business structures 
(social networks).
63. Franchising and Other Collaborative Forms
The modern retail sector in the Western world cannot be imagined without SME 
collaboration, in the form of buying groups, voluntary wholesale organizations and 
franchise organizations. Although significant differences are present within these three 
collaborative forms (Stern et al. 1996), this paper will only deal with franchising as a 
generic term for all forms of commercial collaboration (see Van Witteloostuijn, 1995). 
And, although many different types of franchising exist (e.g. product, trademark, business 
format, soft/hard), we will not deal with the differences of these separate types. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that a complex system of fees may occur, with 
elements like initial franchise fee, royalty fees, advertising fees, sales of products, rental 
and lease fees and management fees.
Lewison (1997) defined franchising as a continuing relationship in which the 
franchisor provides a licensed privilege to do business, plus assistance in organizing, 
training, merchandising and management in return for financial compensation by the 
franchisee. Services provided by franchisors to their franchisees include market survey, 
site selection, joint buying, management training, and advertising. There are various 
forms of franchising, some of them requiring very intensive forms of collaboration and 
some less intensive forms (‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ franchising). Reviews of various choices 
regarding franchising can be found, inter alia, in Kaufman (1999) and Stanworth and 
Curran (1999). Note that all four aspects of ethnic entrepreneurship which were 
mentioned in the previous sections (clients, capital, labor, motivation) are involved in the 
franchise concept. 
The empirical signals of the success of franchising efforts are ambiguous. Reinders 
and Verhallen (1996) noted that membership of a franchise organization is lucrative: 
allied small retailers perform better than their non-allied counterparts, in that they tend to 
realize higher profits and to show a more professional, active market approach. 
Apparently, franchising is a balanced system of pros and cons. On the other hand, Bates 
(1995) concluded that franchise start-ups exhibit both higher rates of business failure and 
lower mean profitability than corresponding independent start-ups. In his opinion, the 
reason for this was that the popular franchising niches were already saturated.
In general, collaboration in the market is concerned with the creation of a certain 
balance among competing firms: the existence of market power creates an incentive to 
organize another power to counter it (Galbraith (1980), Kent et al (1982), Kirzner (1997), 
and Shane, 2003). This is illustrated by Masurel and Janszen (1998), who found that, as 
large firms tend to dominate the market, more SMEs participate in franchise 
7organizations. They observed that 29.7% of all SMEs in the Netherlands were members 
of franchise organizations, and even as much as 79.0% in the grocery sector (1996 
figures).
This is not, however, the place to deal extensively with the franchise phenomenon. 
We are primarily looking for explanations as to why the ethnic entrepreneurs do not join 
these collaborative forms. For more details on franchising, the interested reader may refer 
to Grünhagen and Dorsch (2003), Michael (2003, 2002, 1996), Hoy and Shane (1998), 
Shane (1998) and Lafontaine (1992), They also showed that there are many different 
types of franchising.
Empirical evidence of ethnic entrepreneurs in the retail sector joining franchise 
organizations is hard to find, both in the Netherlands and in other Western countries. The 
general view is that their degree of participation is almost zero (Detailhandelsmagazine, 
1995). Suyver and Lie A Kwie (1998) calculated that only 2% of ethnic entrepreneurs 
were members of a franchise organization. Although this information may be somewhat 
dated, it can be stated that their degree of participation is still very low. The main valid 
explanation is a mutual lack of familiarity, i.e. ignorance on both sides. This finding is 
not a political statement, but based on value-free observation.
Information on the relationship between ethnic entrepreneurs and franchise 
organizations is scarce, and hardly any additional information on different ethnic groups 
is available in this context. Two reasons for this scarcity of information are that no 
specific systematic information on the background of the entrepreneur has been gathered, 
and there is also a great deal of distrust towards interviewers among ethnic entrepreneurs. 
These feelings of distrust are generally reflected in the low participation in surveys. This 
low participation is a serious source of concern, and therefore in our empirical fieldwork, 
as well as doing other things to solve this problem, we worked with a co-ethnic 
interviewer.
In this paper we focus on one specific form of institutional collaboration, viz. 
franchising. In accordance with the Dutch situation, the phrase ‘franchising’ will be used 
loosely, also covering more general forms of commercial collaboration, like buying 
groups. Other relevant forms of institutional business cooperation for ethnic 
entrepreneurs (e.g. trade associations (see Bennet and Robson, 2001), and local 
shopkeepers’ associations) are not considered here. To date, the issue of weak 
institutional orientation among ethnic firms has not been dealt with in the literature. 
84. Research Questions
As the literature on SMEs does not offer much systematic information about the 
non-participation of ethnic entrepreneurs in franchise organizations or other collaborative 
institutions, this makes it difficult to formulate in advance any clearly founded and 
testable hypotheses. It is not known whether it is a matter of unwilling, unable, unknown, 
or even unwanted. Therefore, the research we present here is of an exploratory character. 
Ultimately, we try to relate the research outcomes to the specific aspects of ethnic 
entrepreneurship, in this way linking theory and practice with each other.
An empirical investigation into the reasons why ethnic entrepreneurs do not join 
franchise organizations forms the core of the research in this paper. Some possible or 
plausible explanatory reasons for this low participation were largely identified by internal 
brainstorming sessions, by a scan of the scarce literature, and by pilot interviews. Clearly, 
such reasons are not mutually exclusive and may overlap to some extent. The possible 
explanations can be formulated as follows: ethnic entrepreneurs do not join franchise 
organizations because:
1. They think joining such organizations will serve no useful purpose.
2. They think membership will cost too much.
3. Their business is too informal.
4. They are afraid to lose their independence.
5. They are not well-informed about this form of collaboration.
6. It is contrary to their cultural background.
7. It is contrary to their religious background.
8. They think they will not be accepted by such organizations.
The first four reasons have to do with the firm itself: these we will call ‘economic 
factors’ and all have to do with the market. Reason 5 has to do with communication, 
reason 6 with culture and reason 7 with religion. The latter two factors come closest to 
typical ethnic traits. Finally, reason 8 is external to the entrepreneurs, i.e. it depends on 
the franchise organizations. Later, in Section 8, this all-embracing reason is broken down 
in greater detail into a number of perceived reasons (given by the entrepreneur) as to why 
the franchise organization would not accept him (or her).
These research questions have to be tested against empirical facts; this requires field 
research among ethnic entrepreneurs. 
95.    Turkish Entrepreneurs in Amsterdam
Much literature has been devoted to the diversity in attitude and behavior of ethnic 
groups. One thing is clear: ethnic entrepreneurship is a multifaceted phenomenon that has 
at least as many sides as there are different ethnic groups. We may refer here to an 
abundance of studies, by among others Aldrich and Waldinger (1990), Barret et al. 
(1996), Basu (1998), Boissevain and Grotenbreg (1986), Boraah and Hart (1999), Curran 
and Blackburn (1993), Deakins et al. (1997), Deakins (1999), European Commission 
(2003), Johnson (2000), Lee et al. (1997), Ram and Deakins (1996), Waldinger and 
Aldrich (1990), and Waldinger et al. (1990b).
The literature shows convincingly that it is not possible to distinguish one single 
model of ethnic entrepreneurship or of ethnic business, not even within one given ethnic 
group (see, e.g., Curran and Blackburn (1993) and Li (1992)). As already mentioned, in 
our investigation we have chosen to study one specific group of ethnic entrepreneurs in 
Amsterdam, viz. those of Turkish origin. This group is illustrative of ethnic entrepreneurs 
in the Netherlands and is very recognizable in the Dutch socioeconomic landscape 
(Choenni and Choenni, 1998).
The first wave (or generation) of Turkish immigration to the Netherlands took place 
in the 1960s and 1970s. The shortage of unskilled laborers led the Dutch government to 
sign a treaty with the Turkish government concerning the immigration of ‘guest laborers’. 
Following the initial solo male immigration period, the males were joined by their 
families in the 1970s and 1980s.
Today, there are some 300,000 people of Turkish origin residing in the Netherlands 
(about 2% of the total population). In Amsterdam alone there are about 35,000 Turkish 
residents (5% of the population) (Feijter et al. 2001). These figures are not entirely 
unambiguous and depend on the definition used; we deploy here the limited, most 
common definition of ‘allochthonous’: anyone born abroad and who has at least one 
parent born abroad, as well as anyone born in the Netherlands both of whose parents were 
born abroad (CBS, 1998). It should be noted that there is a great deal of discussion 
concerning the definition of the term ‘ethnic’, but this is not the place to deal with that 
question. 
Choenni (1997) noted that more than 10% of the Turkish working population in 
Amsterdam are entrepreneurs, and they constitute about 20% of all ethnic entrepreneurs 
in Amsterdam. This information is somewhat dated, however, and their share has likely 
increased. The retail sector, with its low entry barriers, is important for Turkish 
entrepreneurs.
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Recent research has pointed out that Turks are the main group of ethnic 
entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (www.kvk.nl). They operate mainly in the hospitality 
sector, the retail sector and the temporary employment sector.
Jansen et al. (2003) concluded that, despite certain disadvantages compared with 
the native Dutch population, immigrants from Turkey show the same rate of 
entrepreneurship. Although the Turkish immigrants have similar characteristics to other 
immigrants (from Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles), their rate of entrepreneurship is 
much higher than the rate of these other groups.
Kruiderink (2000) concluded that the percentage of starters is far higher for ethnic 
groups than it is for domestic groups. However, their failure rate is also much higher. 
This results in a relatively low survival rate. Clearly, because ethnic entrepreneurship is a 
multifaceted phenomenon, a made-to-measure policy is imperative.
Ethnic entrepreneurship is not a homogeneous phenomenon, and one may wonder 
to what extent Turkish entrepreneurs are representative of all ethnic entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands. However, franchise organizations hardly ever seem to incorporate ethnic 
entrepreneurs of any kind in their membership. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
interviewing minorities is always difficult, as often there is suspicion about the use of the 
outcomes of this type of research. There is also a fear that information collected on 
sometimes informal activities is not in the interest of the ethnic entrepreneur. Werbner 
(1999) mentioned the occasional nature of their earnings, and the unreported, informal 
economy as the main reasons for false statistics in the context of ethnic entrepreneurship. 
We tried to cope with this problem by working with a co-ethnic interviewer.
Many Turkish entrepreneurs have an Islamic background. Although this 
background is increasingly becoming mixed with Western values, it is important to note 
here some of the main characteristics of Islam. Rice (1999) observed that Islam is not 
generally understood, and frequently misunderstood, but in fact contains essentially a 
complete socioeconomic system, with its own behavioral codes. In Islam, ethics appears 
to dominate economics. The teachings of the Koran (revealed by God to Mohamed in the 
7th century) and the Sunnah (the recorded sayings of Mohamed) are the basis of the 
Islamic ethical system: the ‘moral filter’, unity, justice, trusteeship, and the need for 
balance.
Clearly, not all these factors act as manifest explanatory variables for an ethnic 
entrepreneurial behavioral code of conduct. But it is likely that a blend of such factors 
may lead to deviant market behavior (for more information, see Lewis and Algaoud 
(2001), and Igbel and Llewellyn (2001)). 
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6. Characteristics of the Interviewees
A sample of 40 Turkish grocers in Amsterdam were interviewed in the period June-
July 2001. The interviewer, also Turkish, had mastered both Turkish and Dutch, and 
occasionally assisted the respondents with additional information. This improved the 
reliability of the answers given. Nevertheless, due to the cultural context of the 
respondents, there is always the possibility of misunderstanding. Thus, such information 
has to be treated with great caution. It should be added that not all respondents answered 
all questions.
In total, 50 Turkish grocers were asked to participate in the interviews. The 
selection criteria were twofold: the respondents had to be Turkish, and had to be grocers. 
The main reasons why some of the entrepreneurs refused to cooperate were that they 
distrusted the interviewer, or that they were too busy in their shop.
The selection process was not easy, as there is - for reasons of privacy - no official 
record in the Netherlands of Turkish entrepreneurs. The Yellow Pages were initially used 
to select the participants by family name, after which the interviewer visited their 
respective shops. Some participants were selected merely by walking around those 
neighborhoods where many Turkish entrepreneurs are concentrated. So some bias might 
have occurred, although this is offset by the fairly high response rate. The sample is 
therefore most likely quite typical of the Turkish grocery sector in the Netherlands.
The questionnaire was available in both Turkish and Dutch. Only 4 respondents 
chose to use the Dutch version, and the remaining 36 preferred the Turkish version. 
Of the 40 entrepreneurs, 27 were between 25 and 39 years old, while 4 were 
younger than 24, and 9 were older than 40. 8 respondents had completed university or 
polytechnic education1.
17 respondents had started their business themselves, mostly in the 1990s; 2 
entrepreneurs mentioned that they had started their business as an extension of a current 
shop. The remaining 23 respondents indicated that their business was a takeover, mostly 
in the 1990s.
Of the 40 respondents, 29 were the sole proprietors of the shop. Of the remaining 
group, the average number of proprietors was 1.7 (for these cases 2 or 3 owners). In 10 of 
the 11 cases where there was more than 1 proprietor, all of them were Turkish, and 
                                                     
1 The entrepreneur was also asked whether he belonged to the first or second generation of immigrants. 
There appeared to be a great deal of confusion about this question, and at the end of the project it became 
clear that a number of respondents interpreted this question differently from the way it was intended. They 
interpreted generation as referring to the decade in which they immigrated into the Netherlands (the 
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generally from the same region in Turkey. The exception was a Turkish entrepreneur 
from Bulgaria. As the respondents were all business owners, we call them entrepreneurs. 
The average number of people employed in the business was 2.6 persons. 12 of the 40 
shops had no employees other than the owner(s). It should be noted that there is, in 
general, a number of what are referred to as ‘non-registered’ working people in ethnic 
firms: they are not by definition ‘black workers’, but can also be volunteers or family 
members (mostly working part-time). The average business had a floor space of 120 
square meters, and 35 of the 40 owners had only one shop. The average age of the firms 
was 12 years. 
It was striking that, although the interviewees were grocers, most sales were 
obtained specifically from greengrocery, rather than from general grocery. Furthermore, 
there were substantial sales in both meat and dairy products. The other categories of sales 
were mainly cigarettes, soft drinks, and candy. This indicates a blurring of traditional 
sector differences.
All respondents purchased products from the Dutch domestic market. Only 3 
respondents also imported goods, mostly from Turkey. Almost all products were 
purchased from wholesalers, especially Dutch and Turkish wholesalers in the 
Netherlands. The respondents dealt with both Dutch and Turkish wholesalers, because 
they served both native and ethnic clients. The buying practice correlated with the 
nationality of the wholesaler: for Dutch products, the retailers turned mostly to native 
wholesalers, whereas for Turkish products they turned to Turkish wholesalers.
7. Research Responses and Interpretation
It is striking that none of the 40 interviewed entrepreneurs actually participated in a 
franchise organization or was a member of any other comparable collaborative 
organization. Some of them had tried to start some form of collaborative association in 
the past, but these efforts were not successful. The main reasons for this failure were: lack 
of interest by other retailers; lack of agreement among the potential members; lack of 
experience with this form of collaboration; lack of unity among the potential members; 
and, finally, lack of trust. Furthermore, a number of interviewees were prejudiced against 
Dutch institutions in general, viz. they believed they were not welcome or that the 
institutions would work against their interests. We will come back to this later.
                                                                                                                                                             
migration of the 1960s and 1970s comprises more or less the first generation, and the migration of the 
1970s and 1980s the second generation). 
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We will now address the research questions from Section 4. First, the average 
scores are presented in Table 1. We asked the entrepreneurs whether they agreed with a 
certain answer, on a five-point scale, which varied from ‘completely disagree’ (score 1) to 
‘completely agree’ (score 5). Furthermore, on the basis of the Wilcoxon test, we also 
determined whether there are significant differences between the importance attached to 
the different answers. Note that not all questions were answered by all 40 respondents. 
The Wilcoxon test is a so-called non-parametric test, especially fit for dealing with small 
numbers. 
== INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ==
The main reason for not joining a franchise organization was that the respondents 
were not well-informed about this particular phenomenon. Note that the average score for 
all the reasons is close to the answer ‘neutral’, and not close to the convincing ‘(strongly) 
agree’.
The second reason given was that the respondents thought it was very unlikely that 
they would be accepted by franchise organizations. Additional evidence indicated that the 
market does not offer sufficient benefits to ethnic retailers (see Section 8). In this respect, 
it appeared to be a matter of simply believing they were unable to join. This reason does 
not differ significantly in importance from the first reason.
The doubted usefulness of joining a franchise organization for the entrepreneurs 
was ranked as the third reason for not joining such an organization. However, in terms of 
significance, this reason appears to be just as important as the first two reasons. So, in this 
respect, the entrepreneur deliberately decided to choose not to join.
The fourth reason given for not joining a franchise organization was the cost factor: 
it would be too expensive. So, even if the entrepreneur was willing to join a franchise 
organization, he would still not be able to do so. This response may correlate with scale-
disadvantages: Turkish shops are generally small, in contrast to the rest of the Dutch retail 
sector. Note that this reason is equally as significant as the first one.
Next, we found the informal way of doing business by the ethnic entrepreneurs was 
an obstacle to joining franchise organizations. This may be reflected in, for example, the 
varied composition of their assortments, in contrast to the more limited composition of 
franchisees’ assortments. 
This latter reason does not differ significantly from the first four reasons but is 
ranked last of the group of main reasons for not joining (based on its average score). It 
has an average score which is closer to ‘neutral’ than to ‘disagree’.
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A gap occurs between these first five reasons and the next three. Fear of losing their
independence is significantly less important, as is shown in Table 1. The most 
pronounced disagreement was expressed in the answers to the questions dealing with 
cultural and religious background.  Note that these last three reasons are closer to 
‘disagree’ than to ‘neutral’. This pattern may have to do with the fact that franchising is a 
rather unknown phenomenon to the ethnic entrepreneurs.
In summary, communication, decision making by external parties, and economic 
reasons are primarily responsible for the fact that ethnic entrepreneurs do not join 
franchise organizations. Cultural and religious reasons as such hardly play a role. 
However, it is striking that the highest average of the reasons is still not higher than 3.03, 
which is close to ‘neutral’. The lowest average is 2.16, which is slightly higher than 
‘disagree’.
We also looked for differences within the group of respondents. The data set was 
segmented on the basis of age (with a cut-off point at 35 years old), generation (born in 
the Netherlands or younger than six years old at the time of immigration defines the first 
generation, the remainder being second generation), and year of immigration  (before or 
after 1988). Only the combination of religious background and the year of immigration 
appeared to play a role: for respondents who had immigrated before 1988, religious 
reasons were more important in deciding not to join franchise organizations than they 
were for respondents who had immigrated after 1988. So we can state, in general, that our 
group of respondents is rather homogeneous.
One crucial question is whether the typical aspects of ethnic entrepreneurship are 
reflected in this explanation. The answer to this is negative. We may conclude that the 
lack of institutional collaboration of ethnic entrepreneurs is not so much explained by the 
typical traits of ethnic entrepreneurship but merely by communication, by the perception 
of having no chance of being accepted and by economic factors. The typical ethnic traits 
are at best indirectly important, i.e. in influencing communication, visualizing external 
decision making, and economic factors. As such, the typical ethnic traits (culture and 
religion) end up in the rear. Coming back to Waldinger et al. (1990a): the low degree of 
institutional collaboration of ethnic entrepreneurs is associated with their opportunity 
structure (in relation to communication, acceptance, and economic factors); it does not 
seem to have to do with their group characteristics, except perhaps indirectly.
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8. Perceived Grounds for Rejection by Franchise Organizations
The uniformity of Turkish entrepreneurs in their reasons for not joining a franchise 
organization finds its counterpart in another intriguing issue, viz. whether Turkish 
entrepreneurs see their perceived acceptance by franchise organizations as a major 
obstacle. And therefore, our respondents were also asked what they saw was the main 
reason why franchise organizations might not be willing to accept them. Clearly, this 
perception may differ from the actual reasons why they are not accepted, but it is this 
perception, which actually influences the daily behavior of the entrepreneur in his attitude 
to joining franchise organizations. In the end, it is the franchise organization that decides 
whether a firm is allowed to join or not. Its criteria mainly have to do with the 
characteristics of the firm and the market situation. The policy of franchise organizations 
to attract new member varies from passive to active. We also note that we did not look 
whether the respondents were member of other organizations as an alternative. It is not 
unthinkable that co-ethnic networks have such a function. 
The main reason for not being accepted by franchise organizations is the idea that 
these organizations think that the market does not offer sufficient benefits to the ethnic 
firms, as indicated in Table 2. Whether this is true, is still an open question in two 
respects. First, is this really the reason why franchise organizations reject them? And, 
secondly, is it really true that the market does not offer sufficient benefits?
== INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ==
In addition, there are other important supposed reasons for rejection that do not 
differ in strength significantly from the principal perception, in particular:
- Language deficiency among ethnic entrepreneurs, which makes communication too 
complicated and costly; 
- Insufficient specific knowledge of ethnic minorities by franchise organizations;
- Presumed lack of records, diplomas or certificates among ethnic entrepreneurs;
- Insufficient knowledge of management, legal procedures and rules, marketing, and 
technology among ethnic entrepreneurs;
- Inferior educational level of ethnic entrepreneurs, that is too low for them to become a 
meaningful business partner. 
So the main perceived reason among Turkish entrepreneurs as to why franchise 
organizations do not accept ethnic entrepreneurs, viz. market conditions, is actually 
beyond the control of the entrepreneurs. The next reasons for non-acceptance seem to be 
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rectifiable, i.e. language deficiency of ethnic entrepreneurs, and the knowledge of 
franchise organizations about ethnic people. The other reasons do not seem to be 
rectifiable at least in the short run: lack of records, diplomas and certificates; lack of 
knowledge and skills; and low educational level. We note that the scores of all six 
perceived reasons why franchise organizations would not accept ethnic entrepreneurs 
center around 3.00, which is the ‘neutral’ score.
Finally, we address the less important perceptions: tensions with the socio-cultural 
background of the ethnic entrepreneurs; their lack of knowledge of, and experience with, 
the Dutch market; the unattractiveness of their site; insufficient market opportunities for 
good profitability; lack of a solid financial basis; and, finally, the tension with the 
religious background of the entrepreneur. All these scores are in the order of magnitude 
of 2.50, which falls in-between ‘neutral’ and ‘disagree’.
Regarding perceived grounds for rejection by franchise organizations, we also 
looked for differences within the group of respondents. Only a few differences appeared 
to emerge. Those who immigrated before 1988 more frequently thought that lack of a 
solid financial basis played a role, as did those who were older than 35. Furthermore, 
those who were younger than 35 tended to believe more frequently that lack of records, 
diplomas or certificates would play a role, compared with the opinion of their 
counterparts who were older than 35. In general, however, the group of respondents 
appeared to be fairly homogeneous, with regard to their perceptions.
9. Conclusions and Recommendations
Ethnic entrepreneurs hardly ever join formal constellations of institutional 
collaboration in general, and franchise organizations in particular, a situation which may 
partly explain their high failure rate. The generality of our conclusions is subject to debate 
however: we are only dealing with one single group (Turks) in one single country (the 
Netherlands). Nevertheless, our approach has value for future research in this field, not in 
the least because of our research orientation, which originates from a broad review of the 
international literature.
Poor communication, a low chance of being accepted by the external party, and 
economic market factors appear to be among the main reasons why ethnic entrepreneurs 
do not join franchise organizations. Poor communication is reflected in insufficient 
information about franchising. The perceived reasons why franchise organizations would 
not accept ethnic entrepreneurs is a mixture of economic factors, the difficulty of dealing 
with each other, and various deficiencies on the side of the ethnic entrepreneurs. The 
17
economic factors, why ethnic entrepreneurs do not want to join franchise organizations, 
are reflected in no perceived benefits, costs too high, current business too informal and 
fear of losing their independence. 
The low chance of being accepted is reflected in the entrepreneurs’ perception of 
market conditions, which are beyond their control. But furthermore, there are also 
rectifiable reasons for rejection, which appear to play a role, especially concerning the 
development of language skills by the ethnic entrepreneurs, and the improvement of the 
franchise organizations’ knowledge about ethnic entrepreneurs. The other reasons do not 
seem to be rectifiable, at least the short term: lack of records, diplomas and certificates; 
lack of knowledge and skills; and low educational level. Altogether, these are the factors, 
which are responsible for the isolated position of the ethnic entrepreneurs and which 
would need to be dealt with if the aim is to increase the participation of ethnic 
entrepreneurs in franchise organizations.
Our analysis has demonstrated that - as part of a research agenda - additional 
research among franchise organizations themselves about their views on ethnic 
entrepreneurs is necessary. Complementary research is also required to analyze the 
attitude to franchising of other ethnic groups, as we know that the phenomenon of ethnic 
entrepreneurship may be quite diverse among different ethnic groups. The process model 
introduced by Hood et al. (1993) may serve as a basis for this.
In conclusion, the main reasons why ethnic entrepreneurs do not join franchises 
stem from poor communication, the perception of rejection, and economic factors. 
Concerning the poor communication: this is a phenomenon that unfortunately often 
emerges in a multicultural society. In order to encourage the participation of minority 
groups in collaborative systems (not only franchise organizations but also trade 
associations, local shopkeepers’ associations, etc.), new tailor-made initiatives have to be 
developed. In the context of the retail sector, this task of encouraging ethnic membership 
of franchise organizations seems to be a natural role for wholesalers, with whom the 
ethnic entrepreneurs come together in their dealings. It might begin as a low-profile and 
light institutional effort, perhaps with bonuses for purchases and low membership fees, 
etc. for specific groups, but such an effort might have a clear benefit to all in the long run.
Additional research among franchise organizations themselves about how they 
themselves view ethnic entrepreneurs is necessary. The economic factors in this context 
can hardly be denied: it is a fact that ethnic businesses are in general economically 
vulnerable and often show an informal way of doing business. This may also have to do 
with the typical characteristics of ethnic businesses (the role of the extended family and 
their motivation to start up their own business).  Normally, after some time, ethnic 
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business may upgrade and thus become more eligible to join franchise organizations and 
other native-dominated institutional collaborations so as to avoid lock-in behaviour. 
The perceived preliminary conclusions and recommendations resulting from our 
survey bring us back to Simmel (1950): the stranger appears as a trader and usually has 
big problems becoming assimilated in the new society. Improving communication and 
suppressing prejudices may help to make the stranger a more accepted person in a new 
society. This will undoubtedly improve his competitive and innovative potential. The 
previous analysis has shown that institutional support systems may act as significant 
support mechanism of economy dynamics and innovation. From an endogenous growth 
perspective one might argue that such institutional frameworks may become instrumental 
parameters in dedicated urban growth policy, where communication and participatory 
strategies may act as key conditions. The degree of flexibility and sharing of interest 
among ethnic groups is an important handle for new entrepreneurial perspectives among 
migrant entrepreneurs in the city. 
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Table 1.  Reasons not to join a franchise organization by Turkish entrepreneurs
n average P-value
Insufficient information about franchising 39 3.03 1.000*
No chance of being accepted 39 2.95 0.767*
No perceived benefits 38 2.95 0.745*
Costs too high 38 2.89 0.611*
Current business too informal 38 2.84 0.470*
Afraid to lose independence 38 2.42 0.018+
Tension with cultural background 38 2.26 0.002+
Incompatibility with religious background 38 2.16 0.000+
 * Does not differ significantly at the 10% level from first item.
 + Differs significantly at the 10% level from first item.
Table 2. Perceived reasons by Turkish entrepreneurs why franchise organizations 
would not accept ethnic entrepreneurs
N average P-value
No competitive advantages for ethnic entrepreneurs 40 3.23 1.000*
Language deficiency of ethnic entrepreneurs 40 3.20 0.913*
Insufficient knowledge about ethnic people 40 3.15 0.769*
Lack of records, etc., by ethnic entrepreneurs 40 3.00 0.441*
Lack of knowledge and skills by ethnic entrepreneurs 40 2.95 0.318*
Low educational level of ethnic entrepreneurs 40 2.83 0.147*
Tension with cultural background of ethnic entrepreneurs 40 2.70 0.060+
Limited experience with the Dutch market 40 2.68 0.057+
Inappropriate location of ethnic enterprises 40 2.58 0.018+
Low returns for ethnic enterprises 40 2.50 0.013+
Lack of solid financial basis for ethnic enterprise 40 2.40 0.003+
Incompatibility with religious background 40 2.30 0.000+
(10) Typos
 * Does not differ significantly at the 10% level from first item.
 + Differs significantly at the 10% level from first item.
